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Abstract 
 
The authors examine the relationship between interest cost to the issuer of municipal bonds and 
legal counsel associated with the offering. Modeling interest cost with explanatory variables 
reflecting legal counsel, issue characteristics, and conditions in the financial markets, the authors 
conclude that offerings in which an active bond counsel participated had average interest costs 
statistically significantly lower than those without such counsel. Offerings involving issuer=s 
counsel and activity of underwriter=s counsel experienced statistically higher average interest costs 
than otherwise. The authors note that their results are consistent with the certification hypothesis. 
 
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
ublicly available sources of information including bond rating agents, analysts, underwriters, and legal counsel 
exist to help issuers and investors evaluate an offering=s risk and price. J. M. Keynes might have been 
referring to any of these participants (he was in fact referring to underwriters) when he noted, AThey are very 
much concerned with their reputation and with the 'success' of their issues from the point of view of those who have 
purchased them.@ [1930, p. 368] Akerlof [1970] noted that development of institutional and contractual arrangements 
(like that between issuers and counsel) permits markets to function when information is biased either toward buyers or 
sellersCas when buyers cannot distinguish lemons from cream puffs. 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) showed that successful companiesC and by inference, municipalities Cmay forgo 
investment opportunities rather than issue new securities because the offerings of successful issuers will be pooled with 
those of unsuccessful issuers. This bias is overcome when issuers have a credible way to reveal information to 
investors. Issuers credibly reveal information through the use of third-party certification by players in the primary 
market, such as bond-rating agencies, underwriters, and legal counsel. 
 
Although research regarding bond ratings and the information contained in choice of underwriter is rich and 
varied, it has generally ignored other players in the primary market. This paper contributes to previous studies by 
examining the relationship between legal counsel and cost to the issuer of municipal bonds. The municipal bond market 
is worthy of investigation because it differs from the market for equities and corporate bonds in several ways: Interest 
income from a municipal bond is exempt from federal taxation; the market for municipal offerings is regional rather 
than national; commercial banks often serve as underwriters of municipal offerings; and municipal bond offerings are 
subject to fewer disclosure requirements than are corporate bond and stock offerings. 
 
Activity and the associated public exposure of legal counsel may improve market efficiency by determining the 
expected level of informed investor activity. The certification hypothesis suggests that some issuers would offer 
securities at too low a price without a knowledgeable and recognizable counsel to certify the quality of an offering. 
Booth and Smith [1986, p. 264] note that when insiders fail to communicate credibly their beliefs or when outsiders  
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cannot buy useful information, a potential market failure is the result. This potential suggests that issuers are motivated 
to use knowledgeable legal counsel to certify the issue price and that outsiders use them as markers for quality. 
 
Evidence of the impact of legal counsel in the bond market has been anecdotal. For example, a reporter for 
The Wall Street Journal [Peers (1988)] described an attempt in the municipal bond market to reduce expenses by 
ending the use of bond counsel. In early 1988 the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey tried to offer $100 
million without an independent legal opinion, using only the issuer=s counsel. By not getting an outside opinion from a 
bond counsel, PONYNJ saved $25,000. [Peers (1988)] A Washington state legislative committee considered a proposal 
to use only issuer=s counselCthe Attorney GeneralCon state offerings. Strong opposition from the Attorney General=s 
office helped to defeat the proposal, which would have saved the state about $200,000 annually. [Peers (1988)] 
 
Part 1 of the paper examines the literature on the role of bond counsel and of two other legal counsel often 
associated with a municipal bond offering, issuer=s and underwriter=s counsel. Part 2 describes the sample of 340 
offerings examined in this study and includes a discussion of the statistical methodology used to build a model of 
interest cost. Part 3 discusses variables used to test hypotheses. Independent variables reflect the counsel, issue 
characteristics, and market influences. 
 
Part 4 presents results of statistical analysis. Based on a regression model, the main findings are as follows: 
Interest cost is significantly associated with choice of legal counsel. Specifically, we find that when controlling for 
other influences, average interest cost to issuers (1) declines as bond counsel activity increases and (2) increases when 
underwriter=s counsel activity increases and when issuer=s counsel is present. Part 5 concludes the paper and offers 
useful explanations. 
 
2.0  Counsel Role 
 
In an imperfect financial market in which some participants have an informational advantage over others, legal counsel 
lease their knowledge and reputations to issuers. In this way, they assist issuers in pricing their offerings and investors 
in sorting out lemons from cream puffs. Three sets of counsel are associated with a bond offering: bond counsel, 
issuer=s counsel, and underwriter=s counsel. The following discussion briefly explains the role of each in a municipal-
bond offering. 
 
Use of bond counsel in municipal financing transactions originated from the need to provide assurance to 
prospective bondholders. That remains true today. As Ettlinger and Koehane [1993, p. 702] assert, AA more complex 
financial market and an ever-changing tax regulatory scheme justify a bewildered investor's increased reliance upon the 
expertise of bond counsel both to determine the structure of a municipal financing and to effect legal compliance with 
such structure.@ 
 
Municipal bond offerings are subject to fewer disclosure requirements than are corporate bond and stock 
offerings. [Hume (1995)] Given the comparative lack of required disclosure and information about the financial status 
of the political agency issuing the bonds, we argue that investors may be more likely to rely on the legal opinion issued 
by bond counsel as to the soundness of the bond issue. It is reasonable to assert that the more reliance investors place 
on the legal opinion, the more impact the choice of bond counsel should have on the interest cost of the offering. 
 
Issuer=s counsel may be called on to assist with a variety of matters. For example, issuer=s counsel helps to 
draft necessary documentation and to secure required regulatory approvals. It also helps to complete procedural steps 
for the issue and to provide information to bond counsel and underwriter=s counsel for use in drafting bond documents. 
[Petersen (1993), pp 642B644] Unlike bond counsel, however, the focus of issuer=s counsel is to represent the interests 
of the issuer, and in each of these matters issuer=s counsel may negotiate with bond counsel on behalf of the issuer. 
 
Underwriter=s counsel plays a role in developing the financial scheme employed by the underwriter to finance 
purchase of the bonds (when appropriate) and in assisting bond counsel with drafting and reviewing bond 
documentation. [Smith and Pirog (1983), pp. 239B243] At closing, underwriter=s counsel issues an opinion that the 
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disclosure obligations of the underwriter have been satisfied under federal and state securities laws. 
 
The adversarial role of the underwriter=s counsel ensures that the contract between issuer and underwriter 
adequately protects the underwriter=s interests and that the underwriter performs its obligation to make adequate 
disclosure when marketing the bonds to the public. The adversarial nature of the underwriter=s counsel is underscored 
by litigation such as a 1994 case in which a jury ordered a Detroit law firm to pay more than $22 million to a 
municipal-bond issuer for failing to disclose that the firm represented both underwriter and issuer. [Stevens (1994)] 
 
3.0  Data And Methodology 
 
3.1  Data 
 
The data set (acquired from Securities Data Company) consisted of 340 municipal bond offerings by Texas 
issuers during 1995. Exhibit 1 shows descriptive statistics of summary variables. Average activity by the issuers 
consisted of three offerings; however, the maximum number of offerings was eight. Average maturity of the 253 
offerings with such information was 9.73 years with a standard deviation of 3.33 years. Offering size varied 
dramatically. The smallest offering was $50,000 and the largest, $300 million. The standard deviation was $39.06 
million. 
 
 
EXHIBIT 1: Summary Statistics of Municipal Offerings in the Data Seta 
 
 Maximum Mean Minimum Std Deviation Valid N 
Issuer activityb 8 3 1 3 340 
Maturityc 35 9.73 1.29 3.33 253 
Amount of offeringd $300.00 $18.42 $.05 $39.06 340 
True interest cost 9.32% 5.94% 4.17% .86% 70 
Net interest cost 9.37% 5.79 3.61% .63% 156 
Long-term ratee 8.09% 7.33% 6.58% .47% 340 
Short-term ratef 6.21% 5.95% 5.64% .13% 340 
a 340 Texas municipal offerings, January 1, 1995BJune 30, 1995. 
b Number of times issuer is in data set. 
c Years and fraction of a year. 
d Millions of current dollars. 
e Effective yield on a 30-year treasury bond. 
f Effective yield on a 13-week T-bill. 
 
 
Interest costs in the data set were measured in two different ways, net interest cost and true interest cost. Each 
measure yielded similar descriptive statistics. True interest cost calculated as an annual rate compounded annually 
ranged from 4.17% to 9.32% with a standard deviation of 0.86%. Equivalent values for net interest cost were 5.79% 
and 9.37% with a standard deviation of 0.63%. 
 
Two variables in Exhibit 1 describe the interest rate environment during the period examined in the paper. 
Long-term rates (measured by the effective yield on 30-year maturity Treasurys) ranged from 7.33% to 6.58% with a 
standard deviation of 0.47%. Short-term rates (measured by the effective yield on 13-week maturity Treasurys) had a 
range of 57 basis points, from 5.64% to 6.21% with a standard deviation of 0.13%. 
 
3.2  Methodology 
 
Our statistical method of choice was categorical regression with optimal scaling (Meulman, 2001), which 
extends the standard approaches of regression and loglinear modeling by quantifying categorical variables.
1
 Terza 
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(1987) notes that employing ordinal qualitative regressors may produce substantial efficiency gains and bias reduction 
in the estimation of qualitative shifts in the regression line relative to the use of the conventional dummy-variable 
approach. 
We assigned simultaneously scale values to independent variables reflecting nominal, ordinal, and numerical 
variables to reflect characteristics of the original categories.
2
 The methodology maximizes the squared correlation 
between the transformed response and the weighted combination of transformed predictors. 
 
4.0  Variables In The Analysis 
 
Model building began by selecting variables used in previous studies to measure the influences on interest cost 
to the issuer. The dependent variable was interest cost, and independent variables reflected legal counsel, issuer 
characteristics, and market conditions. 
 
4.1  Dependent Variable 
 
True interest cost (TIC) was our choice on theoretical grounds to use as the dependent variable because it 
recognizes opportunity cost. [Fortune (1991); Mumy (1978); Sorensen (1980)] True interest cost is the expected rate of 
return on investment to the investor calculated iteratively as a single discount rate equating the present value of the 
debt-service payments to the issue price net of issue costs. 
 
Net interest cost (NIC) is an alternative to true interest cost (or present value interest cost) as a measure of the 
cost to an issuer. [Hopewell and Kaufman (1974); Osteryoung, Braswell, and Blevins (1979)] Net interest cost is the 
undiscounted sum of interest payments an issuer makes over the maturity of the issue less any premium measured by the 
projected offering price less underwriter spread and face value of the issue, all divided by the number of bond years in 
the issue, that is, the sum of the number of bonds of each serial maturity multiplied by that maturity in years. Bierwag 
[1981] and West [1968 ] have noted the differences between TIC and NIC, demonstrating the excess costs to the issuer 
and determining beneficiaries when NIC is used as an acceptance criterion. 
 
We completed statistical analyses using NIC as the dependent variable (156 issues) and, separately, TIC (70 
issues). Results were similar with each. We were concerned about the sample sizes and loss of information from 
excluding observations with missing values, so we considered combining them. Bierwag [1981, pp. 104B107] noted 
that theoretically and practically NIC and TIC typically lead to the same rank order: AFor the most part then, even after 
accounting for differences in spreads and prospective yields, the lowest NIC bid also implies the lowest TIC bid.@ 
[1981, p. 105] 
 
We used Bierwag=s suggestion to examine in our sample the relationship between NIC and TIC. There existed 
a very good linear fit between true interest cost and net interest cost for the common portion of the sample offerings. 
Noting the correlation (ρ=0.935) and then the linearity in a scatterplot of TIC and NIC ordered in time, we then used 
regression analysis to determine coefficients in estimating interest cost for those offerings lacking TIC (α = 0.52, 
β1 = 0.93, R
2
 = 0.874). Consequently, the reported results combine the two samples. The procedure increased the 
number of useable offerings from 156 (with net interest cost reported) and 70 (with TIC reported) to 187. 
 
For computational purposes (the CATREG program truncates fractional values after a decimal), we converted 
the dependent variable to basis points. To minimize output we used consecutive integers beginning with 1 by 
subtracting from each observation the minimum and adding one to the result. 
 
4.2  Counsel Characteristics 
 
Measuring prestige of an investment banker is well established in the literature: One need only to look at the 
relative position in published tombstones. Alas, no established method exists to measure prestige of legal counsel. Law 
firms serving as legal counsel typically are recognized anecdotally as those ?. . . with an established reputation in the  
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investment community for experience, expertise, and reliability in municipal finance.@ [Kraft (1983), p. 228] We 
realized that developing a measure of legal counsel prestige would be problematic. 
 
 
We turned for a measure of prestige to The Bond Buyer, a national trade publication which publishes annual 
rankings of the nation=s top bond counsel. These rankings show 35 firms based on the dollar amount of municipal bond 
offerings handled by each. The Bond Buyer offers no independent ranking of quality or reputation. However, inclusion 
in these national rankings implies that a firm is among the nation=s leading law firms in terms of the dollar amount of 
bond transactions handled. Moreover, an increased volume of offerings means that the legal counsel=s work is exposed 
often to the scrutiny of the market place. 
 
To argue that the volume of underwritings is a reliable measure of high prestige may be incorrect. One could 
counter that high volume suggests a willingness of the legal counsel to do any issue without much regard to quality of 
the certification rendered. Consequently, we take the conservative approach of examining the activity of the counsel 
and its relationship to interest cost and hesitate to make inferences regarding reputation. 
 
4.3  Bond Counsel 
 
The data set included six bond counsel from The Bond Buyer rankings of 35 legal counsel. Their rankings (in 
rank order from highest to lowest) and the number and average size of offerings (in millions) in the data set were as 
follows : Chapman Cutler (4 offerings, $13.72); McCall (90, $23.01); Fulbright (100, $18.67); PeckBShaffer (2, 
$0.58); Vinson (62, $20.97); and Hutchison (6, $2.33). 
 
Exhibit 2 shows summary statistics associated with presence of an active bond counsel for a particular 
offering. Offerings with bond counsel included in this ranking had lower average net and true interest costs (5.8% and 
5.8%) than those without such counsel (5.9% and 6.3%). Average activity of issuers with active bond counsel and that 
of their less active counterparts were similar. Average maturity of offerings with active bond counsel was slightly less 
than their non-prestigious counterparts (9.66 years and 10 years, respectively), but the larger standard deviation of the 
active offerings suggests greater variability among offerings. 
 
 
EXHIBIT 2. Active Bond Counsel and Summary Valuesa 
 
 Not Active (unranked) Active (ranked) 
Mean Maximum Minimum Std Deviation Mean Maximum Minimum Std 
Deviation 
NIC 5.9% 9.4% 4.9% 0.8% 5.8% 7.6% 3.6% 0.6% 
TIC 6.3% 9.3% 5.0% 1.1% 5.8% 8.2% 4.2% 0.7% 
Activity 2 8 1 1 2 8 1 1 
Maturityb 10 32 2.88 3.71 9.66 35 1.29 3.23 
Offering 
sizec 
$12.1 $300 $0.2 $36.9 $20.3 $300 $0.1 $39.5 
a Prestige determined by appearance in  The Bond Buyer. 
b Years and fraction of a year. 
c Millions of current dollars. 
 
 
Exhibit 3 presents information regarding categorical values and the presence of an active bond counsel in an 
offering. Though generally similar between the two broad classifications, two values are noteworthy. Offerings without 
active bond counsel were typically negotiated (52%) and consisted of low-rated bondsCBB and BBB. In all other 
categories, active bond counsel prevailed proportionally. 
 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research                                                                            Volume 19, Number 3 
 24 
EXHIBIT 3. Bond Counsel Activity and Categorical Variables 
 
 Not Active Active  
Number Row % Number Row % Row 
Number 
Offering type 
Competitive bid   65 35.9% 116 64.1% 181 
Negotiated   77 52.4%   70 47.6% 147 
Bond type 
GO   97 44.3% 122 55.7% 219 
Revenue   45 38.8%   71 61.2% 116 
Credit enhancement 
None   94 45.6% 112 54.4% 206 
Enhanced   52 38.8%   82 61.2% 134 
Call 
Not callable   43 41.2%   64 59.8% 107 
Callable 103 44.2% 130 55.8% 233 
Rating 
Not rated   38 45.2%   46 54.8%   84 
BB     1 100.0%     0 0    1 
BBB     6 66.7%     3 33.3%    9 
A    4 44.4%     5 55.6%    9 
AA   10 38.5%   16 61.5% 26 
AAA   77 40.5% 113 59.5% 190 
 
 
We coded this variable (scaled ordinally) 1 if the counsel were not included in The Bond Buyer and 2 through 
6 to reflect the relative rankings, where 6 was the top-ranked bond counsel, Chapman Cutler. In terms of statistical 
testing, the question is whether ß10. We expect this coefficient to be negative to reflect favorably the certification by 
an active and knowledgeable bond counsel. 
 
4.4  Issuer=s Counsel 
 
None of the issuer=s counsel in our data set was in The Bond Buyer listing. However, we wanted to include a 
categorical variable to capture the influence. 
 
Panel A in Exhibit 4 shows summary values of each offering classified according to whether or not the issuer 
used a counsel. The exhibit shows that offerings with issuer=s counsel had higher average NICs and TICs than those 
without counsel. Maturity of the offerings with issuer=s counsel was on average slightly less than one year greater than 
that of the offerings in which issuers did not use a counsel, and both groups were roughly equally active. Average size 
of an offering was $20.5 million for those with an issuer=s counsel, $18.3 for those without. 
 
Issuer=s counsel was scaled nominally and coded 1 if not present and 2 otherwise. In terms of statistical 
testing, the question is whether ß20. We expect this coefficient to be negative because of the adversarial nature of the 
counsel. 
 
4.5  Underwriter=s Counsel 
 
The sample included nine underwriter=s counsel included in the rankings of The Bond Buyer. Their relative 
positions (from highest to lowest) in the rankings, and the number and average size of offerings in millions in the  data  
set  were as  follows:  Chapman  Cutler (3 offerings,  $18.55);  Squire BSanders  (2, $58.2);  Kutak (3, $5.14); McCall 
(10, $9); Fulbright (15, $15.68); GilmoreBBell (1, $6.25); Vinson (10, $39.24); Ballard (2, $28.37); and 
DickinsonBWright (1, $5). 
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EXHIBIT 4. Summary Values, Issuer=s Counsel, and Underwriter=s Counsel Used in the Analysis 
 
Panel A. Presence of Issuer=s Counsel and Summary Valuesa 
 No Issuer=s Counsel Issuer=s Counsel Present 
Mean Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
 NIC 5.74% 7.65% 3.61% 0.55% 7.18% 9.37% 6.46% 1.23% 
 True interest cost 5.82% 7.53% 4.17% 0.71% 7.50% 9.32% 6.65% 1.22% 
 Activity 2 8 1 1 2 5 1 1 
 Maturity (years) 9.67 35 1.29 3.11 10.44 32 5.1 5.33 
 Offering Size $18.27 $300 $0.05 $39.84 $20.51 $100 $0.25 $26.41 
a Twenty-three offerings had issuer counsel. 
 
Panel B. Activity of Underwriter=s Counsel and Summary Valuesa 
 Active Active 
Mean Maximum Minimum Std 
Deviation 
Mean Maximum Minimum Std 
Deviation 
NIC 5.75%2 9.37% 3.61% 0.63% 6.08% 6.99% 5.13% 0.73% 
True interest 
cost 
5.88% 9.32% 4.17% 0.88% 6.29% 6.85% 5.21% 0.59% 
Issuer activity 2 8 1 2 2 5 1 1 
Maturity 
(years) 
9.63 32 1.29 3.07 10.67 35 7.5 5.12 
Offering Size $18.1 $300 $0.05 $40.3 $20.7 $168.5 $0.2 30.5 
a Activity determined by rank in The Bond Buyer. Thirty-three had active underwriter’s counsel measured as discussed in the text. 
 
 
Panel B of Exhibit 4 shows summary variables classified according to whether or not underwriter=s counsel 
was in The Bond Buyer rankings. Offerings in the data set with active underwriter=s counsel had higher average NICs 
and TICs than those without active underwriter=s counsel. However, standard deviations of the active set were smaller 
than those of their less active counterparts. Average maturity of the active offerings was only slightly longer than their 
less active counterparts (10.7 years versus 9.6 years), but the offerings with active underwriter=s counsel had a 
substantially larger standard deviation. Issuer activity and average offering size were generally similar between the two 
groups, although standard deviations varied substantially. 
 
Activity of underwriter=s counsel (ß3) was scaled ordinally and coded similarly to that of bond counsel: 1 if 
the counsel were not included in The Bond Buyer rankings and 2 through 9 to reflect the relative rankings, where 9 was 
the top-ranked underwriter=s counsel (Chapman Cutler). In terms of statistical testing, the question is whether ß30. 
We expect this coefficient to be positive to reflect the assistance of the counsel to the underwriter. 
 
4.6  Issue Characteristics 
 
Issue characteristics pertain to a specific offering. In this way, they are features over which the issuer itself has 
some control. Issue characteristics used in this study consist of those suggested in the literature: underwriter prestige, 
type of offering, negotiated or competitive bid, size of offering, rating, credit enhancement, call provisions, issuer 
activity, and average maturity of the offering. 
 
4.7  Underwriter Prestige 
 
We included a metric of underwriter prestige because other studies used it when examining the influence on 
offering prices and interest cost. [Carter and Manaster (1990); Johnson and Miller (1988); Roden and Bassler (1996)] 
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Prestige of the managing underwriter and of members of the bulge bracket affects the pricing of a new issue. 
 
We rely on the system of Hayes [1971] of Robertson [1973] in noting the rigid hierarchy of the investment-
banking industry discernible in tombstone announcements. Tombstones first list manager and co-manager firms, 
followed by the bulge bracket, the major bracket, and the sub-major bracket. Prestigious firms have upper-bracket 
positions. Less prestigious firms have positions in lower brackets. Tombstones list firms usually (but not always) 
alphabetically within brackets. 
 
To develop the metric, we examined tombstones of municipal-bond offerings in the national edition of The 
Wall Street Journal for the three years 1993B1995. We noted the managing group, the bulge bracket, the major bracket, 
or otherwise. We combined managing and bulge brackets, leaving three categories. Underwriters in these three 
categories were compared with the list of lead underwriters in our data set and assigned the following (scaled 
ordinally): 3=major, 2=bulge, and 1=all others. 
 
4.8  Other Issue Characteristics 
 
Joehnk and Kidwell [1979] found statistical evidence that revenue bonds have a cost structure that differs from 
that of general obligation bonds, leading to higher interest cost to an issuer of revenue bonds. Thus, studies of costs and 
returns in the municipal bond market should include a variable to capture a higher interest cost to revenue bonds. To 
capture this influence, we classified values into two categories scaled ordinally: 1 = general obligation and 
2 = otherwise (revenue). 
 
Research [Joehnk and Kidwell (1979); Kidwell and Rogowski (1983)] suggests that negotiated issues have 
significantly higher interest costs than competitively bid issues have. This study uses four classifications of offerings to 
reflect the richness of types available in the data set. Rather than the typical classification of negotiated and 
competitively bid, the data set included negotiated public offerings, negotiated limited offerings (open to a limited 
number of underwriters), competitive bid, and private placements. These variables were scaled nominally and 
categorized as follows: 1 = negotiated public, 2 = negotiated limited, 3 = competitive bid, and 4 = private placement. 
 
Issue size has been found to influence interest cost [Braswell (1981); Joehnk and Kidwell (1979); Kidwell and 
Rogowski (1983)] as a result of increasing returns. The sign of the issue-size coefficient depends on whether economies 
or diseconomies of scale exist. The following analysis includes the size of issue in current dollars to control for this 
effect. We scaled this variable as numeric, but did not recode it. However, we did adjust values to minimize output and 
to use consecutive integers beginning with one. That required us to subtract the minimum issue size ($5,000) from each 
value and to add one to the results. 
 
Previous studies have found that bond ratings relate to interest costs of corporate and municipal debt. [Clarke 
(1997); Fortune (1991)] The usual method of handling such a variable is with zero-one dichotomous variables for each 
classification (minus one to establish a reference group). Categorical regression uses one variable scaled to reflect the 
number of classifications, thus simplifying interpretation. 
 
The data set included ratings from both Standard & Poor's Corporation and from Moody=s Investor Services. 
Offerings with split ratings have been found to trade at yields equal to those of the higher rating. [Hsueh and Kidwell 
(1988)] Therefore, offerings in the data set with split ratings were treated as though they had the higher rating. Ratings 
ranged from AAA through BB to not rated. For computational purposes, we scaled this variable ordinally and coded the 
ratings from 1 through 6, with AAA=6. 
 
Credit enhancement may influence the rating. Insured bonds typically receive an AAA rating. However, bonds 
receiving an AAA rating because of the rating process may have interest costs lower than bonds that receive such a 
rating because of credit enhancement. [Hsueh and Kidwell (1988)] To control for such an influence, this study included 
a category scaled nominally of 1 = not credit enhanced and 2 = credit enhanced. 
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Smith [1987] found the presence of a call provision to be a significant explanatory variable in his probit 
analysis of municipal offerings. A call provision offers an issuer the option of calling the bond and replacing it with 
another. Investors typically require a higher return to compensate them for the likelihood that the issuer will call the 
bond in a lower interest-rate environment, thus reducing investor wealth. This categorical variable, scaled nominally, 
was coded as 1 = callable and 2 = non-callable. 
 
Previous research [Carter (1992); Roden and Bland (1986)] noted that issuer activity influences the interest 
cost of offerings. One interpretation of increased issuer activity is that it should contribute to lower interest cost because 
active issuers have experience in the primary market and thus may obtain lower interest costs. Moreover, their need to 
enter often the primary market exposes the issuer to increased scrutiny of the market place. Increased scrutiny reduces 
uncertainty surrounding the issuer=s ability to pay and so reduces the default risk premium included in interest cost. An 
alternative interpretation is that the need to enter often the primary market suggests that the issuer is poorly planning its 
cash flow requirements; thus, investors may perceive ineffective financial management and thereby increase the default 
risk premium applied to the offering. A measure of activity scaled numerically captured this influence. The variable was 
simply the number of times an issuer=s offerings appeared in the data set, where 1 = minimum and 8 = maximum. 
 
Investors in bonds with long terms to maturity expose cet. par. their portfolios to greater interest-rate risk than 
do investors in short-term securities. In addition, liquidity and transaction costs influence interest cost. Because of the 
serial nature of the municipal bond issue, maturity may affect the interest cost to the issuer. [Fortune (1991)] Longer 
maturity means more strips and smaller average size of strip, so this influence was recognized with a variable scaled 
numerically reflecting the period to first call (for callable bonds) or average maturity (for non-callable bonds). For 
computational purposes, we adjusted values to minimize output and to use consecutive integers beginning with one. 
 
4.9  Market Characteristics 
 
Financial theory suggests that risk of a municipal bond should be explained by the covariance of the security's 
return with the return on investment in a diversified portfolio. However, absence of a secondary market for issues in the 
sample restricted our choice of a risk measure. Ritter [1984] suggests a proxy for the theoretically-sound measure. He 
argues that issues with high variance are likely those for which a high degree of uncertainty exists at the time of the 
offering. To capture this influence, we developed a model of uncertainty in the bond market. Model building began by 
examining a scatterplot of the effective rate on the 30-year Treasurys in the data set ordered sequentially by time. 
Noting the observed trend in the rate, we then used exponential smoothing to model the expected rate. The resulting 
specification of uncertainty was similar to that of Ritter: The error at each observation calculated as the difference 
between the expected rate (fitted values from exponential smoothing) and the observed rate. 
 
For computational purposes, we recoded values to minimize output and to use consecutive integers beginning 
with one. We scaled this variable as numeric. 
 
The period examined in this paper was characterized by bond-market turmoil associated with the financial 
difficulties of Orange County, California. On December 6, 1994, Orange County=s investment fund (along with other 
investors in its investment portfolio) filed for bankruptcy protection. The county contended that every participant in the 
fund should bear its share of the $2.1 billion in losses. On May 17, 1995, Orange County announced that default on its 
outstanding bonds was imminent. To capture the contamination of the municipal bond market from this announcement, 
we included a categorical value, 1 before May 17 and 2 otherwise. We scaled this variable as nominal. 
 
5.0  Results 
 
To begin analysis, we deleted offerings with missing values of the dependent variable. That left us with 187 
offerings. We then verified that the minimum value for each variable was one and recoded as necessary. The remaining 
data set contained offerings with missing values for maturity, type of offering, and rating so further paring of the sample 
was required. Listwise deletion resulted in 153 cases for analysis as follows: 
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Total offerings   340 
Less offerings missing true interest cost or net interest cost  153 
Offerings with TIC or NIC  187 
Less offerings with missing values   
    Maturity  26  
    Type of bond (GO or revenue)    2  
    Rating    6  
    Total    34 
Offerings used with listwise deletion  153 
 
Missing data are a problem for any analysis. So it is appropriate to try different ways of dealing with the 
problem, then compare results and draw conclusions from the comparisons. Analysis was undertaken using two 
different methods for handling data missing randomly. (1) To listwise delete offerings missing any variable specified 
for analysis. (2) To substitute modes of valid values for each missing value when the correlation matrix is calculated. 
The authors note their preference for mode substitution because it does not discard usable offerings compared with 
listwise deletion. Moreover, it is non-biasing and essentially conservative because it weakens relationships among 
transformed values.  The following discussion reports results using mode substitution. Results using listwise deletion 
(and other specifications of the dependent variable) are available from the authors. 
 
Model building led to a regression equation with both analytic validity and predictive value. The top part of 
Exhibit 5 shows model summaries and analysis of variance. In general, the overall relationship between interest cost 
and many of the independent variables is statistically acceptable. Adjusted R
2
 and standard error of the estimate were 
respectively 0.592 and 0.410, respectable for data of this kind. The model was statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
(F =20.29). 
 
Exhibit 5 presents coefficients resulting from model building. An independent predictive relationship existed 
in the analysis for each of the three variables capturing legal-counsel roles. The sign on each coefficient reflects the 
partial correlation between changes in the average level of interest cost and each of the transformed variables.  Pratt=s 
measure of relative importance shows that the set of bond counsel, issuer=s counsel, and underwriter=s counsel have an 
importance of 0.343 (0.031+0.282+0.030), suggesting that legal counsel explain 34.3% of the variability in interest cost 
during the period examined. 
 
Categories of bond counsel activity were associated with a lower average interest cost (ß1=B0.098) and were 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level (F=3.912). In contrast to this negative influence, presence of issuer=s counsel 
(ß2=0.043, F=68.027) and categories of underwriter=s counsel activity (ß3=0.154, F=8.136) contributed to a 
statistically significant increase in the average level of interest cost in this data set. The sign on the coefficient for 
issuer=s counsel was opposite to that hypothesized, suggesting that this counsel=s presence sent a negative signal to the 
market. 
 
Square of the partial coefficient in Exhibit 5 corresponds to the proportion of the variance explained relative to 
the residual response remaining after removing the effects of the other variables in the model. For example, the 
categories of bond counsel had a partial correl ation of B0.149. After removing the effects of other variables in the 
model, presence of an active bond counsel explained 2.22% (B0.149
2
) of the variation in interest cost. Similar values 
for issuer=s and underwriter=s counsel in Exhibit 5 are 28.3% (0.532
2
) and 4.54% (0.213
2
), respectively. 
 
The authors tested the robustness of the signs and significance. We rescaled bond and underwriter=s counsel 
nominally (rather than ordinally as in Exhibit 5) and repeated the analysis. Signs and levels of significance remained 
essentially unchanged. We prefer the ordinal scale and its interpretation because it preserves the rank-order from The 
Bond Buyer. 
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EXHIBIT 5 Coefficients from Regression Analysis (N=187) 
 
R2=0.623     F=20.29* 
AdjAdjusted R2=0.592 SEE=0.410 
 Standardized 
Coefficients 
 Correlations  Tolerance 
Beta Std. 
Error 
F Zero 
Order 
Partial Part Pratt=s 
Importance 
After 
Trans- 
formation 
Before 
Trans- 
formation 
 Legal 
 Counsel 
         
Bond 
Counsel 
B0.098 0 3.912** B0.200 B0.149 B0.09
3 
0.031 0.902 0.861 
Issuer=s 
Counsel 
0.43 0 68.027* 0.41 0.53 0.39 0.282 0.807 0.878 
Underwriter=
s 
Counsel 
0.15 0 8.136* 0.12 0.21 0.13 0.03 0.752 0.757 
 Issue          
Underwriter 0 0 0.849 0.1 0.1  0.007 0.914 0.918 
GO or 
revenue 
0 0 0.592 0.18 0.59 0 0.012 0.819 0.805 
Offering 
type 
B0.445 0 58.783* B0.128 B0.505 B0.35
9 
0.091 0.651 0.652 
Amount B0.186 0 13.477* B0.120 B0.270 B0.17
2 
0.036 0.85 0.853 
Rating B0.028 0 0.305 B0.104 B0.042 B0.02
6 
0.005 0.832 0.807 
Credit 
enhanced 
0.12 0 4.472** 0 0.16 0.1 0.008 0.737 0.718 
Call 
provision 
0.36 0 43.834* 0.33 0.45 0.31 0.191 0.743 0.715 
Activity 0.16 0 10.654* 0.14 0.24 0.15 0.036 0.911 0.894 
Maturity 0.1 0 3.651 0.26 0.14 0.1 0.043 0.757 0.743 
 Market          
Uncertainty 0 0 0.707 0.15 0.1 0 0.01 0.817 0.817 
Orange 
county 
0.36 0 48.303* 0.38 0.47 0.33 0.218 0.822 0.832 
  * Significant at the 0.01 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
Four of the nine variables capturing issue characteristics were not significant at the 0.05 level or higher: 
prestige of the underwriter, classifications of general obligation or revenue bond, activity, and maturity. Five were 
significant in explaining differences in average interest cost: Offering type (β=B0.445, F=58.783) and amount of the 
offering (β=B0.186, F=13.477) contributed independently to average lower costs of interest. In contrast, credit 
enhancement (β=0.115, F=4.472), call (β=0.360, F=43.834), and issuer activity (β=0.160, F=10.654) contributed 
independently to average higher costs. 
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Interest uncertainty was not a significant contributor to the average level of interest cost in the data examined 
here. However, Exhibit 5 reports that announcement of impending default by Orange County (β=0.359, F=48.303) had 
a statistically significant independent positive predictive relationship with interest cost. Indeed, the announcement had 
the largest influence on the variability in interest cost as evidenced by Pratt=s measure of relative importance, 0.218. 
 
Tolerance values, the proportion of a variable=s variance not accounted for by other independent variables in 
the model, help in model diagnostics. For example, consider in Exhibit 5 the tolerance value of bond counsel. Before 
transforming the data for analysis,  86.1% of the variance in bond counsel was not explained by the other 13 variables 
(13.9% was). After transformation, 90.2% was not explained. Hence, transforming values resulted in decreased 
multicollinearity and increased the explanatory power of the bond counsel variable. Variables with low tolerance values 
(and large negative values of Pratt=s measure) contribute little information to the model and suffer from increased 
multicollinearity. The minimum tolerance in Exhibit 5 for transformed values was 0.651 (Offering Type) and there were 
no negative values for Pratt=s measure. We believe that the level of multicollinearity in the models is acceptable based 
on these values. 
 
In summary, results are generally as expected with many significant relationships between interest cost and 
control variables in this study. Two useful findings of this analysis are as follows: (1) Bond counsel activity 
independently contributed significantly to a reduction in the average net interest costs to issuers. (2) Presence of 
issuer=s counsel and activity of underwriter=s counsel contributed independently to a significant increase in the 
average interest cost to issuers in this data set. 
 
6.0  Summary, Implications, And Conclusion 
 
Statistical analysis began by collecting information regarding the reputation of legal counsel and interest cost 
for a sample of 340 municipal offerings during 1995. The authors used as a measure of the activity of bond counsel and 
underwriter=s counsel the rank order in a contemporaneous ranking from The Bond Buyer. An additional explanatory 
variable was presence of an issuer=s counsel. Several categorical and numeric values were included in the analysis to 
account for issue characteristics and market forces. 
 
Consistent with expected results, presence of a visibly active bond counsel provided a negative independent 
predictive relationship with interest cost (ß1=B0.098, F=3.912). For each one standard deviation change in the rank 
order of the transformed categories of bond counsel, average interest cost declined 0.098 standard deviation. 
Unexpected opposite results and interpretation applied to presence of issuer=s counsel (ß2) with statistically 
significantly positive coefficients. Results were as expected for the underwriter=s counsel (ß3) with statistically 
significantly positive coefficients. 
 
Results of this study differ from other studies of influences on interest cost in two ways. First, this study 
introduced legal counsel as players in the new-issues market. No other study has examined statistically this influence. 
Second, it applied categorical regression with optimal scaling to build the model. 
 
The model built in this paper is consistent with the certification hypothesis, in which the signal sent to investors by 
issuers is conditioned on the ability of the counsel to certify the quality of the offering. After controlling for other 
influences, issuers in our sample received a benefit (measured by lower average interest cost) from using an active bond 
counsel. Here, presence of an active bond counsel may offer benefits to the issuer with respect to higher quality advice 
regarding features and timing of the offering, and also signal to investors the quality of the offering. Hence, in the flow 
of information to investors regarding the investment merit of a municipal offering, bond counsel activity is beneficial to 
issuers. 
 
That was not the case for presence of issuer=s counsel and for activity of underwriter=s counsel, each of which 
was associated with an increase in the average cost to issuers. Market participants should not be surprised with the 
positive impact from underwriter=s counsel because it is the agent of the underwriter. However, the positive (and 
statistically significant) sign on categories of issuer=s counsel is counterintuitive and opposite what we hypothesized. 
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Indeed, the notable result of this paper is the negative impact of issuer=s counsel. After all, we reasoned, issuer=s 
counsel is the agent of the issuer and should therefore contribute to a measurable benefit. Market participants evidently 
interpreted such a presence as indicating financial weakness in the issuer. In this sense, no counsel at all was better than 
an issuer=s counsel. 
 
Agency conflict and segmentation of the market for municipal bonds explain the measured negative impact of 
using issuer=s counsel [Feroz and Wilson (1992); Kidwell, Koch, and Stock (1987)]. Because the market is segmented 
and localized, investors exercise monopsony power in the area in which munis are issued. Why should monopsonists 
rely on a signal provided by presence of an issuer=s counsel, whose advice may be biased in favor of the issuer? The 
answer is, They shouldn=t and they don=t. Investors in this segmented market are familiar with the issuer and bid for an 
offering at a price consistent with their perception of the bond counsel, issue characteristics, and market conditions. 
Investors appear to interpret use of issuer=s counsel as a negative signal. 
 
The study here suggests directions for future research. First, the sample should be enlarged to include more 
offerings for a longer period of time in different states. Second, specification of the variables may be changed to see 
how sensitive are results to the specification. For example, researchers may want to develop a measure of prestige 
independent of the activity measure used here, then relate prestige to interest cost. Also, this study examined only the 
primary market. The relationship between counsel and subsequent performance in the secondary market should be 
examined. It is likely that issues using active counsel may enjoy a national market and experience less volatility in the 
secondary market. We leave these issues for future efforts. 
 
In conclusion, issuers of municipal bonds should use the results in this paper to make them receptive to use of 
an active bond counsel and wary of using issuer=s counsel. Issue characteristics and conditions in the market may differ 
from those in this study, but evidence herein is sufficiently strong to place the burden of proof of benefits on the 
issuer=s counsel trying to lease its expertise and reputation to the municipality.   
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1. We rejected standard linear regression analysis for several reasons. First, estimating one coefficient for each variable would 
reflect arbitrary values assigned within categories. Second, standard regression requires numerical independent variables, 
regression with optimal scaling offers three scaling levels for each variable. Third, dealing in standard linear regression with 
the nonlinear relationship between a categorical variable (for example, whether or not an offering is or is not callable) and 
other variables is problematic when an independent variable has both high and low values associated with one value of the 
dependent variable. The independent variable receives only one weight, which cannot reflect the same amount of change in 
the predicted response for both large and small values of the independent variable. Fourth, recoding categorical variables as a 
series of 0B1 interval variables (for example, six bond-rating classifications into five groups) means that the model contains a 
separate intercept and/or slope coefficient for each combination of the levels of the categorical variables. That results in a 
large number of parameters to interpret. 
2. The level of optimal scaling determines the optimality properties of the quantifications. Optimal quantifications are 
unrestricted for nominal values (for example, callable versus noncallable). The program CATREG in SPSS used in this paper 
orders ordinal variables (for example, activity ranking of bond counsel) in the same manner as the original categories. Finally, 
quantifications for numerical values are not only ordered, but also the analysis preserves the proportional difference between 
any two values in the corresponding original categories. 
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